Libya: From Fragmentation to Fragile Transitions

CMPS Background note | 15 May 2025

Libya’s trajectory since 2011 has been shaped by the disintegration of state institutions, the proliferation of armed factions, and the struggle for territorial, economic, and political dominance between rival centers of power. What was once an internationally endorsed transition toward democratic elections has given way to de facto partition, underpinned by patronage networks, militia rule, and externally supported administrations. By 2025, the Libyan conflict has shifted from high-intensity warfare to institutional deadlock and managed instability.

The assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli—commander of the powerful Stability Support Apparatus (SSA)— on 12 May 2025 triggered renewed clashes across Tripoli’s southern districts, including Salah al-Din and Abu Salim. Kikli, a controversial figure with deep ties to Tripoli’s militia ecosystem, was both a symbol of militia dominance and a lightning rod for criticism over human rights violations under the GNU’s interior ministry umbrella. His killing and the ensuing violence highlight the fragility of current ceasefires and the risks posed by security actors operating outside centralized command.

Meanwhile, Libya’s political institutions remain split. The GNU, led by Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in Tripoli, continues to govern without a renewed mandate since the failed elections of December 2021. In the east, the House of Representatives (HoR) and its appointed Prime Minister, Osama Hammad (under Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar’s influence), have institutionalized a parallel administration in Benghazi and Sirte. Despite repeated UN efforts to bridge the divide—including the High-Level Panel on Elections launched in 2024—progress has stalled due to disputes over electoral laws, candidate eligibility, and constitutional arrangements.

In this context, public trust is at a historic low. Youth-led protests in Misrata, Tobruk, and Benghazi during the winter of 2024–2025 denounced political stagnation, power outages, and perceived corruption across both governments. Civil society voices, already weakened by repression and legal ambiguities, have seen limited inclusion in formal negotiation tracks.

This analysis proceeds in five parts: (I) a review of the institutional fragmentation and stalled electoral roadmap; (II) an assessment of Libya’s hybrid security landscape and foreign military presence; (III) an overview of human rights and migration governance issues; (IV) a critical examination of international engagement strategies; and (V) policy-oriented recommendations focused on accountability, disarmament, and inclusive governance. By grounding the analysis in May 2025 realities, this background paper offers a timely strategic outlook for national actors, regional partners, and multilateral institutions engaged in Libya.

I. Political Landscape: Entrenched Rivalries and the Stalemate of Governance

Libya’s political crisis is marked by institutional duality, cyclical negotiation failures, and diminishing legitimacy. Since the postponement of national elections in December 2021, Libya has been governed by two rival administrations—each claiming constitutional and popular legitimacy, yet neither possessing the full authority or public trust necessary to govern effectively.

The Government of National Unity (GNU), established in March 2021 through the UN-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), was intended as an interim authority tasked with leading the country to elections. Headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah and based in Tripoli, the GNU initially garnered wide international recognition. However, its mandate formally expired in December 2021. Since then, it has governed in a caretaker capacity, accused by its opponents of monopolizing executive authority, mismanaging state revenues, and using patronage to maintain militia loyalty in the capital and beyond[1].

Opposing it is the Government of National Stability (GNS), appointed in March 2022 by the House of Representatives (HoR) in Tobruk and backed by the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) led by Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Initially led by Fathi Bashagha, who failed to assert authority in Tripoli, the GNS has since shifted power to Osama Hammad, reflecting the consolidation of Haftar’s grip over eastern and southern Libya. The GNS administers ministries and budgets from Benghazi and Sirte, and has gradually expanded its diplomatic outreach to states such as Russia, Egypt, and the UAE[2].

Efforts to bridge the divide have repeatedly faltered. The UNSMIL High-Level Panel for Elections, launched in 2024 under Special Representative Abdoulaye Bathily, sought to create a consensual constitutional basis for elections. While technical progress was made—particularly in delineating electoral districts and vetting criteria—the process collapsed over disputes regarding presidential candidacy conditions, especially the role of military officials like Haftar, and dual nationals such as Dbeibah. These unresolved questions have blocked agreement on an electoral law and transitional timeline[3].

Parallel negotiations brokered by Egypt and the African Union in early 2025 have not fared better. Rather than facilitating compromise, they have often entrenched positions. In particular, the HoR has used these forums to push for guarantees of continued influence, while the GNU has resisted any outcome that could sideline Dbeibah or impose a new interim authority. These positions reflect deeper structural incentives: both camps benefit materially and politically from the status quo, drawing on public finances and foreign partnerships to maintain parallel institutions[4].

This political fragmentation has had tangible governance costs. In early 2025, Libya operates without a unified budget. Disbursements from the Central Bank in Tripoli—nominally unified under Governor Saddek Elkaber—are increasingly politicized, with contested allocations to the east and allegations of opaque militia payouts in the west[5]. Ministries operate in duplicate, often with contradictory mandates. Public services, particularly in health and electricity, remain underfunded, and infrastructure rehabilitation projects have been stalled across regions due to legal ambiguity over procurement and authority.

In January 2025, coordinated protests erupted in Misrata, Tobruk, and Benghazi, demanding an electoral timetable, an end to elite corruption, and restoration of basic services. Though mostly peaceful, the protests faced intimidation from armed groups and limited media coverage due to fear of reprisal. Civil society organizations and youth-led movements, once central to post-2011 transition hopes, now operate in an increasingly repressive environment, with restrictive NGO laws under review in both Tripoli and Benghazi[6].

Libya’s political impasse in 2025 is no longer merely a question of institutional bifurcation. It has evolved into a system of fragmented sovereignty, where rival authorities coexist, but neither governs with legitimacy nor efficiency. Without sustained international pressure, coherent transitional planning, and grassroots inclusion, the Libyan political scene risks further erosion—potentially paving the way for a return to authoritarian consolidation or localized conflict escalation.

II. Security Environment: Hybrid Control and Renewed Volatility

Libya’s security architecture in 2025 is characterized by fragmentation, hybridity, and persistent instability beneath a surface of relative calm. While the 2020 ceasefire agreement continues to hold in broad terms—especially along traditional frontlines between east and west—security is increasingly dictated by informal alliances, militia patronage, and localized power struggles. The recent assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli and the clashes that followed illustrate how quickly this equilibrium can unravel.

Militia Rule and Urban Fragmentation

In Tripoli, security remains dominated by a constellation of armed groups operating under nominal state control. These include the Stability Support Apparatus (SSA), the 444th Brigade, and the Special Deterrence Force (RADA), among others. While all are technically aligned with the GNU’s Ministry of Interior or Ministry of Defence, they retain operational autonomy and often pursue divergent agendas. Competition over revenue streams, territorial control, and political leverage routinely leads to intra-militia skirmishes and shifting alliances[7].

The assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli in May 2025 sparked some of the most intense urban clashes since the brief 2022 battles between the SSA and the Joint Operations Force. Fighting engulfed southern Tripoli, displacing hundreds of families and damaging infrastructure. The SSA, long criticized for arbitrary arrests and torture, had been under increasing pressure from both international human rights groups and rival militias seeking to curtail its dominance. Kikli’s death has triggered a violent recalibration of Tripoli’s armed landscape, with no clear successor or centralized response from GNU security institutions[8].

Outside Tripoli, hybrid security arrangements persist. In Misrata, the Al-Nawasi Brigade and other local factions maintain territorial control while coordinating selectively with GNU commands. In Zawiya, a key smuggling hub west of the capital, rival militias have vied for control over fuel and migrant trafficking routes, with little interference from central authorities. These dynamics illustrate the ongoing privatization of security, where armed groups act as service providers, protectors, and political brokers in the absence of functional state institutions[9].

Eastern Libya and the Militarized State

In the east, the Libyan Arab Armed Forces (LAAF) under Haftar maintain a hierarchical and disciplined structure, though not without internal rivalries. The LAAF controls Benghazi, Derna, and much of the southern Fezzan region, and has increasingly consolidated administrative power alongside the GNS. Unlike the west, where militias contest each other openly, Haftar has imposed a centralized military order through repression, loyalty networks, and strategic appointments.

However, the veneer of order masks a growing dependence on foreign military support and private military contractors (PMCs). The Russia-Africa Corps, successor to Wagner, continues to operate logistical and training hubs in Jufra and Brak al-Shati. While Moscow maintains plausible deniability, satellite imagery and on-ground testimonies confirm their sustained presence. Egypt, meanwhile, has fortified its border and deepened military cooperation with the LAAF, including joint drills and equipment transfers[10].

In the south, particularly in Murzuq and Sebha, the security vacuum remains acute. Intercommunal violence—often between Tebu and Arab groups—has flared sporadically, with LAAF interventions limited and GNU presence negligible. These areas are also critical corridors for trans-Sahel smuggling, arms trafficking, and irregular migration. The absence of a comprehensive national security strategy has allowed these regions to become de facto autonomous zones shaped by external interests and illicit economies[11].

The Challenge of Demobilization and Reform

Efforts at security sector reform (SSR) remain stalled. Since the 2020 ceasefire, there have been no serious moves toward disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). While the UN and the African Union have proposed local security compacts, implementation has been blocked by political mistrust and lack of enforcement capacity. Crucially, many militias now have entrenched political and economic interests—they control infrastructure, ports, banks, and oil facilities. Disbanding them without credible alternatives and guarantees could provoke renewed conflict.

Moreover, the idea of integrating militias into formal state structures—once popular among external actors—has lost credibility. Without a robust vetting mechanism, accountability processes, and transitional justice framework, integration risks legitimizing war crimes, perpetuating impunity, and reinforcing factionalism within security institutions. Lessons from the 2012–2015 period, where poorly regulated incorporation led to armed group capture of ministries, remain fresh in the public consciousness[12].

Instead, future DDR processes will need to prioritize community-based demobilization, economic reintegration through employment pathways, and transitional justice mechanisms that address past violations. This is particularly vital in areas where civilian-militia tensions remain high, such as in Sirte, Tarhuna, and Bani Walid.

III. Human Rights and Migration: Between Policy Instrumentalization and Structural Abuse

Libya occupies a central—if controversial—position in the Euro-Mediterranean migration landscape. Long considered both a transit hub and a departure point for migrants attempting to reach Europe, the country has become emblematic of the entanglement between migration governance, human rights violations, and international complicity. As of May 2025, the situation of migrants and asylum seekers in Libya remains dire, marked by systemic abuse, lack of legal protections, and a growing mismatch between international rhetoric and actual practice.

Detention, Abuse, and Institutional Complicity

Thousands of migrants and asylum seekers are held across a network of official and unofficial detention centers operated by militias, state-affiliated actors, or a mix of both. Conditions in these facilities continue to fall below international standards. Detainees frequently report extortion, torture, sexual violence, and lack of access to legal representation or due process[13].

Despite promises of reform, no significant progress has been made in dismantling the arbitrary detention regime. The Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration (DCIM), nominally under the GNU’s Ministry of Interior, exercises limited control over most facilities. Several detention sites—particularly in Tripoli, Zawiya, and Bani Walid—remain under militia control. These actors often profit from trafficking networks and use detention as a source of income through ransoms and forced labor arrangements[14].

In 2025, an investigative report by the United Nations Fact-Finding Mission on Libya reiterated previous findings that the use of detention for migration control constitutes crimes against humanity when committed on a widespread or systematic basis. The report also noted that some facilities were operating with indirect support from European-funded programs, raising serious concerns about external complicity in human rights abuses[15].

Migration Control as a Tool of Political Leverage

Libya’s authorities—both east and west—have strategically used migration control as a bargaining chip in their relations with European states. In 2023 and 2024, a series of bilateral deals were signed between the EU and the GNU, focusing on border surveillance, training for the Libyan Coast Guard, and equipment provision, including drones and patrol boats. These deals continued in 2025, despite mounting criticism over the Libyan Coast Guard’s conduct, including documented instances of violent interceptions and cooperation with smugglers[16].

In March 2025, the Wall Street Journal reported that GNU officials had rebuffed informal U.S. overtures to establish processing centers in Libya for deported migrants—a reflection of growing transatlantic interest in offshoring migration control. The GNU’s denial of such arrangements was framed as a defense of sovereignty, but analysts noted that the rejection may also reflect the political cost of association with mass deportation schemes[17].

Simultaneously, authorities in the east have sought to capitalize on EU divisions by offering parallel cooperation frameworks—particularly to Italy and Malta—through Haftar-aligned border forces. These proposals have complicated the EU’s effort to maintain a unified migration policy, while also reinforcing Libya’s de facto political bifurcation.

Lack of Legal Pathways and International Protection

Libya remains neither a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention nor to its 1967 Protocol, and it lacks a domestic asylum law. As a result, the legal status of refugees and asylum seekers is precarious. UNHCR operates in Libya under a limited mandate and continues to face access restrictions. While some emergency evacuations to Niger and Rwanda resumed in early 2025 through the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM), these remain insufficient in scale and scope, reaching only a fraction of those at risk[18].

The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has continued its Voluntary Humanitarian Return (VHR) program, repatriating over 12,000 individuals in the first quarter of 2025 alone. However, critics have raised concerns about whether these returns are truly voluntary, particularly in cases where detainees are given no viable alternatives to indefinite detention or return to unsafe countries of origin[19].

Furthermore, Libya’s fragmented governance means that migrants face vastly different conditions depending on which territory they transit. While the GNU retains more active collaboration with international agencies, the east has limited international access, with LAAF-aligned forces occasionally arresting migrants as suspected “foreign infiltrators,” raising the risk of ethnic profiling and abuse[20].

A System in Crisis, Not Contained

The situation for migrants and refugees in Libya cannot be described as a system in need of reform—it is a system in crisis. The fusion of smuggling networks, state complicity, and international outsourcing has created a closed loop of violence and exploitation. Attempts to address the issue through capacity-building or infrastructure investment alone have proven insufficient in the absence of political will and legal accountability.

For the EU and its partners, the ethical cost of externalized migration control continues to rise. The longer-term consequences are not limited to reputational damage: Libya’s treatment of migrants undermines regional stability, fuels trafficking economies, and reinforces a governance model antithetical to rule-of-law principles.

IV. International Engagement: Fragmented Diplomacy and Strategic Realignment

The international community remains deeply entangled in Libya’s ongoing crisis—politically, militarily, and strategically. While major conflict has receded since 2020, Libya continues to serve as a proxy battleground for regional and global actors. As of mid-2025, international engagement is increasingly shaped by competing interests, fragmented mediation tracks, and a growing fatigue with protracted negotiations.

United Nations: Mandates and Limitations

The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) remains the central multilateral actor, though its influence has waned amid persistent leadership challenges and geopolitical divisions among Security Council members. Following the resignation of Abdoulaye Bathily in early 2025, a new Special Representative—Ghassan al-Khatib, a former Jordanian diplomat—was appointed with a mandate to reinvigorate the electoral track and coordinate international mediation efforts.

Al-Khatib has prioritized a “process over personalities” approach, focusing on establishing inclusive principles for governance and reconciliation, rather than brokering elite power-sharing deals. However, his efforts face resistance from entrenched Libyan factions, and divisions among UNSMIL’s external backers—including the P3 (US, UK, France), Russia, and China—have complicated consensus over mandate renewal and enforcement mechanisms[21].

Additionally, UNSMIL’s civilian-led mediation is increasingly constrained by the presence of foreign military forces on Libyan soil, and its security sector reform proposals—particularly around DDR—lack both local buy-in and enforcement capacity. UN proposals for a new compact between local communities and armed groups, trialed in Sirte and Ubari, have yielded mixed results and are yet to scale nationally[22].

European Union: Prioritizing Containment over Stability

The European Union remains a prominent actor, but its engagement has been shaped primarily by migration containment, energy diplomacy, and counterterrorism cooperation, rather than long-term political stabilization. In 2023 and 2024, the EU signed a series of cooperation agreements with the GNU focusing on border control, support for the Libyan Coast Guard, and the prevention of irregular migration. These policies continued into 2025, despite growing evidence of human rights violations by Libyan authorities and militias involved in migration enforcement[23].

European approaches are also fragmented:

Italy has deepened bilateral energy cooperation with both Tripoli and Benghazi, including Eni-led infrastructure deals in the Sirte Basin.
France, after recalibrating its Sahel strategy, has increased its naval footprint in the central Mediterranean under the pretext of counter-smuggling operations.
Germany has focused on supporting civil society and transitional justice initiatives, but faces growing domestic pressure to limit migrant arrivals.

The 2025 EU-Libya Strategic Framework Review noted the absence of conditionality mechanisms in its aid and security programming, and recommended greater engagement with municipal authorities and civil society as a counterweight to central dysfunction[24].

Regional Powers: Competing Visions for Libya’s Future

Libya’s immediate neighbors and regional powers play increasingly assertive roles.

Egypt, a long-time supporter of Haftar, has continued to host political dialogues and provide logistical support to the LAAF. However, Cairo is also concerned about spillover instability and has endorsed the AU’s call for inclusive reconciliation in 2025.
Algeria, while more diplomatically neutral, has advocated for a Libyan-led process and warned against the militarization of the political track. It maintains security cooperation with both Tripoli and southern Libyan tribal authorities.
Tunisia, under economic duress, has sought energy and border management deals with both Libyan administrations, reflecting a transactional approach.

Further afield, the UAE and Turkey remain the most militarily and politically engaged actors. The UAE continues to support Haftar-aligned forces, particularly through drone technology, strategic advisors, and funding for eastern development projects. Turkey, meanwhile, maintains a Defense Cooperation Agreement with the GNU, under which it operates airbases in Tripoli and Misrata. Turkish military personnel train local forces and provide intelligence support, solidifying Ankara’s presence in western Libya[25].

These actors pursue divergent visions: the UAE and Egypt back a centralized, security-first governance model, while Turkey emphasizes Islamist-aligned civilian coalitions and decentralized control. Their influence further entrenches Libya’s political bifurcation and complicates any notion of neutral mediation.

United States and Russia: Strategic Caution and Opportunism

The United States has adopted a cautious, often reactive approach, focused primarily on counterterrorism operations and energy stability. While Washington nominally supports UNSMIL, its Libya policy is subordinated to broader MENA regional priorities. The U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) continues to monitor terror cells in the south, but recent efforts to engage in migration processing talks with Libya were rebuffed by the GNU, signaling the limits of American leverage[26].

Russia, by contrast, has deepened its military and political footprint. Through the Africa Corps, the successor to the Wagner Group, it maintains strategic facilities in the Fezzan region and provides logistics to Haftar’s forces. Moscow’s approach blends military support, economic cooperation, and media influence—intended to position Russia as a long-term arbiter in post-conflict Libya. While its presence is contested by the West, it remains tolerated or even welcomed in eastern Libya, particularly amid fatigue with Western-led negotiations[27].

V. Policy Recommendations: Pathways Toward Sustainable Stabilization

Libya’s ongoing fragmentation, coupled with militarized governance, elite impunity, and contested sovereignty, demands a calibrated and accountable international response. Superficial stabilization strategies have proven insufficient. The policy priorities outlined below emphasize inclusive state-building, transitional justice, and localized resilience as the cornerstones of any sustainable transition.

Political Process: Recenter Legitimacy and Inclusion

The international community must abandon the binary logic of elite power-sharing and invest instead in multi-layered political dialogue that includes municipal councils, tribal networks, women’s groups, youth movements, and civil society organizations. The political negotiations of the last five years have been dominated by figures with vested interests in maintaining the status quo—many of whom lack any democratic mandate.

UNSMIL should broaden participation in its political track, prioritizing inclusion of previously marginalized groups and local governance actors.
Electoral planning must be decoupled from zero-sum leadership contests. A phased approach, beginning with municipal elections and consensus-building on constitutional principles, could generate momentum while avoiding the polarizing debate over presidential eligibility.
External actors must condition recognition and funding on measurable reforms, such as anti-corruption legislation, budget transparency, and the reactivation of judicial oversight bodies.

Security Sector: Prioritize DDR over Militia Integration

Libya’s security sector cannot be reformed through wholesale integration of militias, a strategy that has historically backfired. Without proper oversight, such integration risks legitimizing actors responsible for war crimes, embedding criminal patronage networks within state institutions, and undermining the chain of command.

A credible path forward requires a Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) strategy rooted in transparency, accountability, and transitional justice:

A national DDR framework should be developed with localized implementation tracks, recognizing Libya’s regional diversity. This could be facilitated by UNSMIL in partnership with the African Union and regional security actors.
Reintegration should be linked to economic pathways, including public sector employment, vocational training, and microfinance for former combatants.
Vetting mechanisms and truth-telling processes must precede or accompany any reintegration, particularly in areas like Tarhuna, Sirte, and Bani Walid where communities have experienced militia atrocities.
Specialized accountability units should be established to investigate and prosecute grave human rights violations committed by armed groups operating under state auspices.

Human Rights and Rule of Law: Reassert Accountability

Without a baseline of human rights protection and legal redress, Libya’s transition will continue to reproduce exclusion and grievance. Despite repeated international statements, detention abuses, arbitrary arrests, and censorship remain widespread.

The EU and UN should publicly condition support for migration control on human rights benchmarks, including access to detention centers, judicial review of detentions, and the dismantling of militia-run facilities.
Support to Libyan legal institutions, including the High Judicial Council and bar associations, should be increased with a focus on independence, legal aid provision, and training in international human rights law.
A transitional justice roadmap, aligned with the African Union’s 2019 Transitional Justice Policy, could guide efforts to address past abuses and prevent cycles of impunity.

International Coordination: End the Multiplicity of Tracks

Libya’s internationalization has produced a fragmented diplomatic landscape, with parallel peace initiatives, contradictory military support, and selective engagement strategies. This incoherence weakens mediation efforts and enables local actors to engage in forum shopping.

The UN Security Council should establish a unified diplomatic umbrella, under which regional and international actors commit to a common roadmap, cease external military support, and harmonize their engagements with Libyan institutions.
Regional formats, such as the Libya Contact Group or African Union’s High-Level Committee, should be empowered to play a more active role in mediation and oversight.
Foreign military withdrawals, particularly of Russian and Turkish forces, must be prioritized as part of any future ceasefire enforcement mechanism.

Libya’s path forward requires diplomatic patience, structural realism, and principled pragmatism. Stabilization must no longer mean preserving the status quo—it must mean enabling Libyans to reconstruct a political order rooted in legitimacy, justice, and collective ownership.

Conclusion

Libya remains suspended between fragmented governance and fragile transitions. More than a decade after the revolution that toppled Gaddafi, the country has not coalesced around a unified political authority, nor achieved the structural reform necessary for institutional stability. Instead, it exists in a liminal space—dominated by competing governments, entrenched militia networks, and strategic foreign interests that have redefined sovereignty along fragmented lines.

Despite the absence of full-scale war, Libya is not at peace. The assassination of Abdel Ghani al-Kikli and subsequent clashes in Tripoli are stark reminders that the current security architecture is precarious. Meanwhile, the failure to implement a credible electoral roadmap, the entrenchment of foreign military presence, and ongoing human rights abuses in detention centers all point to a deeper erosion of state legitimacy.

However, pathways forward remain. They require a radical rethinking of international engagement strategies—from elite bargains to inclusive local dialogue, from tactical migration deals to principled human rights conditionality. The Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of armed groups must be prioritized alongside transitional justice. Elections must be preceded by institutional reconstitution, not rushed for the sake of appearances.

Ultimately, Libya’s future must not be determined solely in foreign capitals or by armed actors, but by the aspirations of its citizens. For regional and international partners, the challenge is not just to support Libya’s transition—but to stop enabling the structures that prevent it.

[1] International Crisis Group, “Libya’s Stalled Transition: Avoiding a Return to Conflict,” February 2025.

[2] Carnegie Middle East Center, “Eastern Libya’s Political Economy under Haftar,” March 2025.

[3] UNSMIL, “High-Level Panel Update on Electoral Track,” 8 April 2025.

[4] Middle East Institute, “Why Libya’s Political Dialogue Keeps Failing,” April 2025.

[5] Libya Herald, “Tripoli’s Budget Battle: East-West Fiscal Disputes Intensify,” 25 March 2025.

[6] Human Rights Watch, “Shrinking Civic Space in Libya,” February 2025.

[7] Libya Desk, “Tripoli’s Armed Groups: Mapping the Balance of Power,” April 2025.

[8] Reuters, “Most Intense Fighting in Years Rocks Libyan Capital,” 14 May 2025.

[9] Carnegie Endowment, “Libya’s Urban Warfare Economy,” March 2025.

[10] Al Monitor, “Russia-Africa Corps Consolidates Presence in Libya’s South,” February 2025.

[11] United Nations Panel of Experts on Libya, “Final Report to the Security Council,” March 2025.

[12] SIPRI, “Security Sector Reform in Post-Conflict Libya: Lessons and Limits,” April 2025.

[13] Amnesty International, “Libya: Detained and Abused,” March 2025.

[14] Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, “Migrant Detention and Profit Networks in Libya,” February 2025.

[15] UN Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya, “Final Report,” April 2025.

[16] Statewatch, “EU-Libya Migration Cooperation Update,” January 2025.

[17] Wall Street Journal, “Libya Rejects U.S. Migrant Processing Proposal,” 20 March 2025.

[18] UNHCR Libya, “Operational Update,” April 2025.

[19] IOM, “Voluntary Humanitarian Return Quarterly Data Brief,” April 2025.

[20] Human Rights Watch, “Abuse and Profiling in Eastern Libya,” March 2025.

[21] UN Security Council Briefing on Libya, 30 April 2025.

[22] United Nations Development Programme Libya, “Community Security Pilots: Mid-Year Assessment,” May 2025.

[23] Statewatch, “EU External Action and Migration Management in Libya,” January 2025.

[24] EU Commission, “2025 Strategic Framework Review: EU Engagement in Libya,” February 2025.

[25] Middle East Eye, “Turkey Expands Its Military Presence in Libya,” March 2025.

[26] Wall Street Journal, Op. cit.

[27] SIPRI, “Russia’s Strategic Presence in North Africa,” April 2025.